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Fundamental what?  
The difficult relationship between Foreign Policy and Fundamental rights 
© Dr Eleanor Spaventa
1
 
[In M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2007] 
 
In the past years we have witnessed an increased activity in the field of EU foreign 
policy. In particular, following the terrorist attacks in the United States first, and in 
Europe later, the Union has adopted a series of measures which directly affect 
individuals. In some instances, those measures were aimed at implementing Security 
Council resolutions which imposed sanctions on named individuals and / or alleged 
terrorist organisations; in other cases, following the general Security Council Resolution 
on terrorism,
2
 the EU adopted its own measures. The ‘fight against terror’ has also led to 
an increased activity in the field of co-operation in the criminal sphere, and most notably 
in the adoption of the framework decision on terrorism and the framework decision on 
the arrest warrant.
3
 
 
The increased activity in fields which affect individual rights raises important problems 
in relation to fundamental rights protection. In this respect, the EU shows a considerable 
degree of schizophrenia: on the one hand, it seeks to reassure its citizens, as well as its 
international partners, as to its sincere commitment to fundamental rights through the 
adoption of the Charter,
4
 its action in the field of discrimination,
5
 the creation of the 
fundamental rights agency,
6
 as well as the considerable improvements that would have 
been introduced by the Constitutional Treaty.
7
 On the other hand, the fundamental rights 
agency lacks powers in relation to co-operation in criminal matters and common and 
foreign security policy, the areas in which fundamental rights scrutiny would have been 
                                                 
11
 Department of Law, Durham University, and Durham European Law Institute. I am grateful to Marise 
Cremona and Bruno de Witte for organising a very stimulating workshop and for their comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to the other participants for a very lively and interesting 
discussion on these issues, and to Andrés Delgado Casteleiro for having very kindly brought to my 
attention the Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling in the SEGI case. The usual disclaimer applies.    
2
UN Security Council Resolution 1373(2001). 
3
 Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002/475/JHA, [2002] OJ L164/3, and Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedure between 
Member States, [2002] OJ L190/1. The latter measure has been the focus of much controversy with 
national courts clearly not being all that confident that it is consistent with fundamental rights. A 
preliminary reference is currently pending in front of the ECJ on the compatibility of the framework 
decision with Article 6 ECHR, see Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de wereld  v Council (Referred by the 
Belgian Court of Arbitration), Opinion delivered 12/09/06. See also the ruling by the German 
Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassunsgeright, 18/7/05, 2 BvR 2236/04. 
4
 [2000] OJ C 364/1, and amended version in Part II of the Constitutional Treaty (2004 OJ C 310/1).  
5
 Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
and ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L 180/22; Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
6
 Regulation 168/2007 establishing a European Agency for Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 53/2. 
7
 E.g. the CT would have made the Charter legally binding; and would have extended the jurisdiction of the 
Court to the third pillar, as well as to CFSP action when such action affected individuals.   
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most needed and useful,
8
 and, generally speaking, the Union seems incapable to ensure 
even that minimum standard of protection required (from the Member States) by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Nor should one consider this schizophrenia as 
simply the result of an inherent pathological condition stemming from the European 
Union’s institutional and constitutional structure. After all, whilst it is true that the second 
and third pillars are ill equipped to afford even a minimum level of democratic and 
judicial accountability, it is also true that action at Union level was not essential, and the 
Member States could have well refrained from using Union instruments until that 
moment in which a more healthy institutional structure had been put into place. And even 
should one consider that co-ordinated Member States’ action would have not been 
sufficient and that therefore Union activity in these fields was an absolute necessity, it 
should be noted that there are instances, some of which will be examined in detail below, 
where the Union and (some) Member States could have chosen a different path to reach 
the same result, whilst being more respectful of both their citizens and their own 
constitutional obligations. 
 
In this contribution I will analyse some of these problems. In particular, after having 
given a brief account of the Union’s institutional structure, I will analyse, from a 
fundamental rights perspective, the problems arising from the adoption of ‘terrorist lists’. 
In this respect it is necessary to distinguish between the Taliban list,
9
 which is of UN 
derivation and which does not leave any discretion to the EU as to whom should be 
included in the list, and the EU’s own list.10 The latter is further divided in two types of 
listing: foreign-linked alleged terrorists, and those alleged terrorists who do not have any 
link with outside the EU.
11
 My overall conclusion is that we are witnessing a progressive 
erosion of the very guarantees that were at the foundation of post-war nation states, a 
result which is perhaps inevitable once concepts which are inherently political, and to a 
certain extent subjective, such as the definition of terrorism,
12
 are transformed into 
objective and unquestionable legal ‘truths’ via the medium of international executive 
action. 
 
                                                 
8
 In this respect, see the statement by the Italian Government concerning the Regulation establishing a 
European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Annex 6166/07, available on statewatch.org; 
www.statewatch.org/news/2007/feb/eu-hra-6166-07.pdf. 
9
 Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of 
the Al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 
2001/771/CFSP, (2002) OJ L 169/4 (Hereinafter Common Position 2002/402, or the Anti-Taliban Common 
Position). The assets of those identified at UN level are frozen pursuant to Council Regulation 88/2002 
imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with 
Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban (…) (2002) OJ L 139/9, as updated regularly 
(hereinafter Council Regulation 88/2002, or the Anti-Taliban Regulation).  
10
 Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
(2001) OJ L 344/93, as updated regularly (hereinafter Common Position 2001/931 or the EU list). 
11
 For sake of convenience I will refer to alleged terrorists and terrorists organisations simply as ‘terrorists’; 
I will also refer to ‘foreign linked’ terrorists, as ‘foreign terrorists’, even though their status has nothing to 
do with nationality. And I will refer to those who have no link with outside the EU as ‘home-terrorist’.   
12
 It is not by coincidence that the UN could not reach an agreement on the definition of ‘terrorism’ in its 
anti-terrorism Resolution ((1373)2001). 
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I THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
 
Action in the field of Common and Foreign Security Policy is pursued through joint 
actions and common positions, whilst the general agenda is set through general 
guidelines and common strategies. Joint actions address specific situations and ‘commit 
the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’.13 
Common positions, on the other hand, define the approach of the Union to ‘a particular 
matter of a geographical or thematic nature’.14 Unanimity is required for both 
instruments, although qualified majority is sufficient when the instrument is adopted on 
the basis of a common strategy. In any event, however, if a Member State opposes Union 
action for reasons of national policy then the instrument can be adopted only following a 
unanimous vote.
15
 The role of the European Parliament is limited to the right to be 
consulted by the Presidency on the main aspects and basic choices concerning the CFSP. 
The Presidency must then ensure that Parliament’s views are taken into due 
consideration; and Parliament must be ‘regularly informed’ in relation to the Union’s 
foreign policy.
16
  
 
The Union can also adopt international agreements in relation to both Common and 
Foreign Security Policy and in relation to fields falling within the scope of police and 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters (Title VI). In relation to those agreements 
Article 24(5) TEU provides that ‘no agreement shall be binding on a Member State 
whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of 
its own constitutional procedure’, even though the other Member States might decide that 
the agreement shall nonetheless apply provisionally. The ‘constitutional safeguard’ 
suggests that the agreement concluded by the Union is binding upon the Member States, 
unless they have made the declaration.  
 
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is excluded in relation to second pillar 
instruments, which, in any case, cannot have direct effect unless the Community takes 
action by using the ‘passarelle clause’ provided in Articles 60 EC read together with 
Article 301 EC. The latter states that when it is provided in a CFSP common position or 
joint action that the Community should take action to ‘interrupt or reduce, in part or 
completely, economic relations with one or more third countries’, the Council must take 
the necessary measures. And Article 60 empowers the Community to take the ‘necessary 
urgent measures on the movement of capital and payments as regards the third countries 
concerned’. Moreover, the Court of First Instance has clarified that Article 60 EC and 
301 EC can be read together with Article 308 EC, in order to establish competence to 
adopt measures for the freezing of assets even when there is no direct connection with a 
third ‘state’. This is the case despite the fact that Article 60 EC provides for the 
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 Article 14 TEU. 
14
 Article 15 TEU. 
15
 Article 23 TEU. 
16
 Article 21 TEU. 
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competence to adopt urgent measures in the field of the free movement of capital in 
relation to ‘third countries’.17  
 
In relation to action in the field of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, the 
two main instruments that can be used are common positions and framework decisions. 
The former define the approach of the Union to a particular matter, whilst the latter are 
akin to directives in the first pillar, but for the explicit exclusion of the possibility of 
direct effect.
18
 Common positions are adopted by the Council without consultation with 
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice does not have any 
jurisdiction (but for the possibility of policing whether the act should have been adopted 
at Community level).
19
 Framework decisions are adopted after consultation with the 
European Parliament and there is limited jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. In 
particular, the Court’s jurisdiction is voluntary, i.e. dependant upon an explicit 
declaration by the Member State,
20
 and is excluded in relation to the review of 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement body.
21
 
The ECJ also has jurisdiction to asses the legality of a framework decision in review 
proceedings: however, only the Commission and the Member States can bring such 
proceedings, to the exclusion not only of individuals, but also of the European 
Parliament.  
 
And, as it has been noted before, the Union can also enter into international agreements 
in matters covered by Titles VI by using the competence provided for in Article 24 TEU 
as provided in Article 38 TEU.
22
 It should be noted, however, that in relation to co-
operation in criminal matters there is no equivalent to the ‘passarelle clause’ provided in 
Articles 60 and 301 EC for the CFSP. Therefore, the use of third pillar competence 
cannot trigger, or be complemented by, Community action.  
                                                 
17
 Cf CFI ruling in Case T-306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, now under appeal in Case C-415/05 P, case 
pending. See also Case T-315/01 Kadi [2005] II-3649, under appeal in Case C-402/05 P, case pending. The 
Community competence to enact freezing Regulations in respect of individuals and organisations not 
having a specific link to a third country is by no means uncontroversial; see e.g. E Spaventa ‘Fundamental 
Rights and the Interface between Second and Third Pillar’ in A Dashwood and M Maresceau ??? 
(forthcoming 2007); EEckhout?; in favour of such an interpretation see C Tomuschat ‘Annotation of the 
Yusuf and Kadi judgments’ in (2006) CML Rev 537.     
18
 Article 34 TEU. 
19
 See, by analogy, Case C-170/96, Commission v Council (Airport Transit Visas) [1998] ECR I-2763. It is 
likely that litigation as to the correct legal basis is on the increase; see e.g. Case C-176/03, Commission v 
Council [2005] ECR I-7879. 
20
 Article 35 TEU. Before the Bulgarian and Romanian accession 14 out of 25 Member States had made 
such a declaration, see Information concerning the declarations by the French Republic and the Republic of 
Hungary on their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the 
acts referred to in Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union [2005] OJ L 327/19.   
21
 Article 35(5) TEU. 
22
 E.g. Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of America [2003] OJ 
L 181/27; see also Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United 
States of America [2003] OJ L 181/34; Agreement between the European Union and the United States of 
America on the processing and transferring of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the 
United States [2006] OJ L 298/29. For a rather critical appraisal of the agreement see the debate in front of 
the plenary session of the European Parliament, Use of Passenger Data, debate of 11/10/06, Document of 
16/10/06, 13991/06 PE 326.    
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It is clear that the institutional framework provided for in relation to the CFSP, with its 
limitation of democratic accountability and the exclusion of any judicial protection, is 
inadequate to meet the basic demands of fundamental rights protection once action taken 
at Union level affects individuals. The same can be said in relation to international 
agreements adopted pursuant Articles 24 and 38 TEU, and in relation to mixed second 
and third pillar instruments, especially when the instrument is adopted through the use of 
a common position thus excluding any possibility of review by the European Court of 
Justice. We shall now turn to analyse the problems arising from the use of Union 
competence to identify individuals and organisations as ‘terrorists’.  
 
II THE UN DERVIVED TERORIST LIST: FROM YUSUF TO AYADI 
 
As mentioned above, terrorist lists have been adopted by the EU in two instruments: 
Common Position 2002/402, which implements the Anti-Taliban UN Security Council 
Resolution by imposing sanctions on those designated by the UN Sanctions Committee as  
being associated with the Taliban, Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the like.
23
 And Common 
Position 2001/931, which contains a list of those identified by Council as being 
connected with terrorism. The format for both types of Acts is the same: the Union adopts 
a Common Position which is then given effect, as far as the freezing of assets is 
concerned, through a Community Regulation adopted on the basis of Articles 60, 301 and 
308 EC.
24
 However, in the case of the UN related list, the Common Position is taken on 
the basis of Article 15 TEU alone,
25
 and the duty to update the list in the Regulation falls 
upon the Commission, which simply has regard to the UN list.  
 
In the case of the ‘home-decided’ lists, the relevant instrument is Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP which has been adopted using a mixed second and third pillar legal basis. 
As we shall see in more detail later, the mixity is due to the fact that Common Position 
2001/931 identifies two categories of terrorists: those who have some link with outside 
the EU, and ‘home terrorists’, whose alleged terrorist activities are confined to within the 
EU boundaries. For this latter category of people, the Council and Commission found 
that there was no competence for enacting a freezing Regulation since there was not even 
a remote link to a third country which would justify the use of CFSP competence and of 
the passarelle clause contained in Articles 301 and 60 EC.
26
 For this reason, this category 
of people and organisations are not subject to EU-wide freezing orders. The list in the 
                                                 
23
 UN Security Council Resolution 1390(2002).  
24
 Council Regulation 88/2002 (the Anti-Taliban Regulation); and Council Regulation 2580/2001 on 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating 
terrorism, (2001) OJ L 344/70. 
25
 Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members 
of the Al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 
2001/771/CFSP, (2002) OJ L 169/4. 
26
 It has been argued that the existence of the general anti-terrorist Resolution would have been enough to 
trigger CFSP competence; on the relationship between the UN anti-terrorist Resolution and Regulation 
2580/2001 see several obiter in Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v 
Council, judgment of 12 December 2006, nyr.     
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Annex to the Common Position is updated regularly and, since in this case it is not a mere 
replication of the UN list, it falls upon the Council to do so voting unanimously.  
 
The legality of both lists has been called into question; since the lists raise different legal 
problems we will first analyse the UN derived list, to ten considered the EU list. As it has 
been mentioned above, the Anti-Taliban Common Position and Regulation are entirely of 
UN derivation and the Community institutions limit themselves to implement what 
decided at UN level. The list is drawn by a UN Sanctions Committee, and unanimity is 
required in order to both place on, and strike off, people and organizations the list. Those 
who have been included have no possibility to seek redress in front of the UN Sanctions 
Committee. Rather, the only avenue open to those affected is to persuade one of the 
Member States (either that of residence or that of nationality) to make representations in 
front of the UN Committee on their behalf; however, since unanimity is required to strike 
off people from the list, such remedy is not particularly effective. Furthermore, the UN 
Sanctions committee is a governmental not a judicial body. It is not surprising then that 
those included in the list might attempt to seek a judicial (and less partial) review of their 
case in front of a national court. In the Community context, since the UN list is 
implemented through a Regulation, the only competent courts to assess the validity of the 
Regulation are the European courts. One such challenge was brought in the Yusuf case.
27
  
 
Mr Yusuf had been placed on the list of those whose assets would be frozen following his 
inclusion in the UN Anti-Taliban list. He brought proceedings for annulment of 
Regulation 881/2002,
28
 on the grounds, inter alia, of breach of fundamental rights. In 
particular, the applicant sought to challenge his inclusion in the Regulation by relying on 
the breach of the right to property and, more importantly, on the breach of his right to a 
fair hearing. In relation to the latter claim, Mr Yusuf stressed how he had not been told 
the reasons which led to the imposition of sanctions against him or the evidence which 
had been relied upon against him; nor had he been given the opportunity to explain 
himself. Given that both the adoption of Regulation 881/2002, and the inclusion of Mr 
Yusuf in the list annexed therein, were a direct consequence of the UN Anti-Taliban 
Resolution,
29
 the Court of First Instance felt it necessary to start by assessing the extent of 
its own jurisdiction to review a Community instrument adopted in order to comply with 
UN obligations.  
 
The Court found that there were ‘structural limits’ imposed to the review it could carry 
out in relation to the Regulation at issue. In particular, since the Council did not have any 
autonomous discretion, a review of the Regulation would imply a review of the UN 
Security Council Resolution, a power that the CFI felt it lacked, both as a matter of 
international law, and as a matter of Community law. However, the CFI accepted that it 
could scrutinise the Regulation, and indirectly the Security Council Resolution, in 
                                                 
27
 Cf CFI ruling in Case T-306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, now under appeal in Case C-405/05 P, case 
pending. See also Case T-315/01 Kadi [2005] ECR II- 3649, under appeal in Case C-402/05 P, case 
pending. 
28
 The original claim related preceding Regulations and was later adjusted when the latter were repealed 
and substituted by Regulation 881/2002. 
29
 UN Security Council Resolution 1390(2002). 
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relation to jus cogens, since such principles also bind the Security Council. As a result, 
the applicable standard of human rights protection is the lower jus cogens standard. In 
this respect, the Court found that the right to property had been adequately safeguarded 
since, following new Resolutions as implemented in Community law, the national 
authorities could (and can) declare that the freezing of funds does not apply to funds 
essential for ordinary expenses (food, medicines, rent etc). More importantly, however, 
the CFI found that the UN Sanctions Committee was under no duty to hear the applicant 
before his inclusion in the list, and that, in any event, the Security Council, by providing 
for the possibility for individuals to petition their State of nationality or of residence to 
make representations to the Sanctions Committee on their behalf, ‘intended to take into 
account, as far as possible,’ the fundamental rights of individuals. Short of errors in the 
identification of the persons concerned, that the CFI seems to be ready to scrutinise, there 
is thus no substantive review at Community level of the soundness of the reasons that led 
to inclusion in the UN list.  
 
The Yusuf ruling has been criticised for several reasons: the CFI’s view of the 
relationship between UN Resolutions and Community law not only reflects an absolute 
monist understanding of the relationship between the two systems, but it also introduces 
something akin to direct effect of international norms within the Community and national 
legal system.
30
 This debatable choice also redefines the effect of international law in 
domestic constitutional systems, rendering UN Resolutions directly effective, and 
unquestionable, in domestic systems through the medium of Community law.
31
 
Furthermore, such pervasive effects in domestic constitutional law have been achieved by 
means of an extensive interpretation of Community competence. The result of the Court’s 
ruling in Yusuf is ultimately to leave a substantial gap in fundamental rights protection, 
by allowing representatives of the executive to impose sanctions on individuals without 
any guarantee as to how such individuals are chosen; and without there be any possibility 
of an independent (if not judicial) assessment of the, at least prima facie, evidence relied 
upon to justify such pervasive measures. Thus, the effect of the ruling is to deprive the 
claimant to any meaningful access to review of his/her inclusion in the UN list.  
 
This said, the approach of the Court is more nuanced than what might appear at first 
sight. First, as we shall see below, it indicates the Court’s readiness to impose a more 
intensive scrutiny for EU produced lists; secondly, in Yusuf, the Court indicated in an 
obiter that it would be open to an applicant to bring judicial review proceedings, based 
either on domestic law or indirectly on Regulation 881/2002, of the national authorities’ 
refusal to make representations on behalf of the listed individual in front of the Sanctions 
Committee.
32
 In the subsequent case of Ayadi,
33
 the CFI clarified that, as a matter of 
                                                 
30
 It is also a matter of debate whether the Yusuf understanding of the relationship between UN Resolutions 
and Community law is consistent with the ECJ decision in Case C-84/95 Boshporus [1996] ECR I-3953, 
where the Court has no problem in scrutinizing a UN Security Council Resolution with the general 
principles of Community law; see also Case of Bosphorus etc v. Ireland (Appl. No. 45036/98), judgment of 
30/6/05. 
31
 On those issues see also N Lavranos ‘Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance’ 
(2006) European Foreign Affairs Review 471. 
32
 Case T-306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para 317. 
33
 Case T-253/02 Ayadi, judgment of 12/07/06, nyr. 
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Community law, the Member States have an obligation to respect the claimant’s 
fundamental rights when dealing with her/his application for review of their case with the 
aim of triggering the procedure for de-listing in front of the Sanctions Committee. The 
obligation to respect fundamental rights also applies in relation to all matters concerning 
the de-listing procedure (i.e. even in relation to the Member State’s negotiations with 
other States); and judicial review of the Member State’s refusal to consider the 
applicant’s case must be ensured as a matter of Community law.  
The reasoning of the CFI is persuasive: the UN Sanctions Committee has, in its 
guidelines, acknowledged that the Resolution in question confers a right on individuals to 
request a review of their case to their State for the purposes of being removed from the 
list. The Community Regulation giving effect to the UN Resolution then needs to be 
interpreted in conformity with the Committee’s guidelines; however, since it is a 
Regulation that gives effect to the sanctions, such right should be seen as guaranteed not 
only by the Guidelines but also by the Community legal order itself. Thus, when the 
Member State examines the request for review, and when the Member State consults 
others States in the context of the procedure that might lead to de-listing, the Member 
State is bound by Article 6 TEU, and by fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community law. Respect for those obligations does not affect the Member State’s 
performance of its UN obligations, and therefore the Yusuf reasoning does not apply to 
the de-listing procedure. Furthermore, the CFI also made clear that, insofar as that is 
allowed by the UN Resolution / Sanctions Committee, the national authorities must act 
proportionately in relation to the freezing order: thus, refusing a taxi driver’s licence to 
the applicant without regard to ‘his needs (…) and without consulting the Sanctions 
Committee’ is a misrepresentation or misapplication of the Regulation concerned. 34 
The effect of Ayadi is a welcomed qualification of the Yusuf ruling: whilst the CFI has 
confirmed the Yusuf interpretation in relation to the hierarchy between UN Resolutions 
and Community law, and whilst it has reaffirmed the exclusion of a possibility of review 
of inclusion in the list, it has imposed upon Member States a substantive Community law 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and the other general principles of Community 
law whenever dealing with those aspects of the Regulation about which the Member 
States (or indeed the Community) enjoy any discretion. Thus, even though the CFI does 
not impose an automatic duty upon Member States to make representations on behalf of 
individuals, it makes denial to do so much more difficult. In dealing with applications for 
review with the view of triggering the de-listing procedure, the national authorities have 
now, as a matter of Community law, several obligations, such as: 
 
(i) a duty to take into account the difficulties that individuals might face in 
protecting themselves, especially given that the person might not know why 
he/she has been put on the list; and might have no knowledge of the evidence 
relied upon against him/her. Thus, the fact that individuals might not be able 
to provide precise and relevant information to support their case should not be 
conclusive;  
                                                 
34
 On the duties falling upon national authorities see also Case T-47/03 R Sison v Council (Interim relief), 
Order [2003] ECR II-2047.  
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(ii) a duty to act ‘promptly’ whenever re-examination seems to be justified; and  
 
(iii) the decision refusing to make representations on behalf of the individual must 
be reviewable as a matter of Community law, even when it would not be so in 
national law.  
 
The Ayadi ruling is a clear attempt to afford the best protection possible, given the 
circumstances, to the individual. In this respect the principle of supremacy and direct 
effect of Community fundamental rights, together with ample discretion left to the 
national authorities to ensure as effective a protection as possible, narrows the gap in 
fundamental rights protection opened by the use of Community competence to implement 
UN individual sanctions. The irony now lies in the fact that those included in the EU list 
might well find themselves in a worse position that those included in the UN list.  
 
III THE EU LISTS – THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ‘TERRORISTS’ 
 
As we mentioned above, the Union has also drafted its ‘own’ list of terrorists in Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP. The latter Common Position has been adopted in order to 
implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373(2001) on terrorism (the Anti-terrorist 
Resolution) which, inter alia, provides that States must freeze the assets of terrorist 
organisations and individuals; of entities controlled by terrorist organisations / 
individuals; of persons acting on behalf of terrorist organisations/individuals. The UN 
Security Council Resolution however fails to identify such entities, and it does not 
provide a list like the one adopted in relation to the Taliban Resolution. Furthermore, the 
Resolution fails to define what is meant by ‘terrorist’ act, offence etc, since agreement 
could not be reached on that point. Common Position 2001/931 on the other hand, gives a 
rather broad definition of terrorist act (which has been later duplicated in the Framework 
decision on terrorism),
35
 and provides that the list of those identified as terrorist shall be 
drawn up on the ‘basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which 
indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority’ in relation to those 
groups. The competent authority ‘shall mean a judicial authority, or, where judicial 
authorities have no competence (…) an equivalent competent authority in that area.’36 
The first issue for consideration relates then to how those who are included in the list are 
actually chosen.  
 
First of all, it should be noted that Common Position 2001/931 does not give any 
indication as to what an ‘equivalent’ competent authority is: in this respect, Tappeiner has 
remarked how, despite what might appear at first sight, the relevant ‘authority’ might not 
only not be a judicial authority, but the criterion of ‘equivalence’ might be interpreted in 
a rather loose way to admit simple (unchecked) intelligence.
37
   
                                                 
35
 Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism 2002/475/JHA, (2002) OJ L 164/3.  
36
 Article 1(4) Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. 
37
 I. Tappeiner ‘The fight against terrorism. The lists and the gaps’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review, 97, and 
on line at www.utrechtlawreview.org. See also Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple 
d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 December 2006, nyr, where Council and the United Kingdom 
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Secondly, it should be noted that the Common Position does not explicitly refer to the 
fact that the authority in question must be that of a Member State, thus leaving the avenue 
open for the possibility that the relevant decision might have been taken by an authority 
outside the European Union. And indeed, the fact that Article 1(4) Common Position 
2001/931 refers to the possibility of including in the list those identified by the UN seems 
to support the view that the authority in question needs not be a domestic one. And at 
least in one case, it seems that the inclusion on the list of one of those individuals might 
have stemmed from political pressure exercised by a foreign country (whether this might 
in certain cases be the only criterion is impossible to say given the secrecy that surrounds 
the entire exercise).
38
 The fact that a decision of a non-EU country might be given such 
pan-European effects is clearly problematic: the fundamental rights standard of the 
country in question might fall short of those (which should be) applied by the Union; and, 
there is an increased danger that inclusion on the list might be the result of a foreign 
policy decision rather than the result of a independent assessment as to whether the 
individual and/or the organisation in question is actually connected to terrorism.    
 
Thirdly, it is impossible to say whether Council exercises any control over the names 
suggested by Member States. Whilst inclusion in the list needs to be unanimously agreed 
by Council, there is the possibility that Council does not in fact exercise a real scrutiny 
over the names suggested by the Member States, and that it merely rubber-stamps the 
decision of other Member States. And, a recent decision of the Court of First Instance, 
seems to have legitimised a ‘rubber-stumping’ approach. In the OMPI case, in relation to 
the list contained in Regulation 2580/2001, the Court held that Council has no other duty 
than to assess whether there exists a decision by a competent authority, excluding 
Council’s duty not only to assess whether the national procedure was conducted 
correctly, but even ‘whether the fundamental rights of the party concerned were respected 
by the national authorities’.39  In this way, the CFI has accepted that a national decision, 
even when not judicial, can be given pan-European effects regardless of whether the 
minimum guarantees of fundamental rights protection required by Article 6 TEU and by 
the general principles of Union law have been respected. This is all the more worrying 
given that, as said above, there is no guarantee that the decision at stake would have been 
adopted by a European Union authority.
40
    
                                                                                                                                                 
refused to (or could not) identify the authority the decision of which led to the inclusion of the applicant in 
the list.   
38
 See the transcript of comments on combating the financing of terrorism made by Alan P. Larson, Under 
Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, in testimony before the House (Congress) 
Committee on Financial Services on 19 September 2002, 
http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorist_Financing/Sep1902_Larson_Testimony.asp; ‘The European 
Union has worked with us to ensure that nearly every terrorist individual and entity designated by the 
United States has also been designated by the European Union’, and also the testimony of Juan C. Zarate 
(Deputy Assistant Secretary, Executive Office) Terrorist financing  and financial crime, US Department of 
the Treasury, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,  18 March 2003, JS-139 
(http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js139.htm). 
39
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr, para 121.  
40
 And, following the recent reports on the Member States’ complacency in relation to ‘extraordinary 
renditions’, and given that the equivalent authority needs not to be a judicial one, it is hardly for the Union 
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Furthermore, given the possibility of lack of scrutiny by Council, there is a real risk that 
inclusion in the list might be politically motivated. In this respect, the Amnesty 
International report on counter-terrorism and EU criminal law refers to the case of Segi. 
As we shall see in more detail in below, SEGI, an organisation supporting Basque 
independence, has been included in the list of ‘home-terrorists’. This notwithstanding the 
French Cour de Cassation upheld the French Court of Appeal’s decision not to surrender 
to the Spanish authorities the spokesperson for SEGI on the grounds that part of the 
alleged offence had been carried out in France. However, the French authorities have 
never taken any action to prosecute the alleged offences.
41
 This reinforces the suspicion 
that the list might serve to introduce a pan-European proscription of organisations even 
when inclusion might be, if not altogether politically motivated, at least deeply routed in 
the political problems/conflict/reality of one single Member State.  
 
Fourthly, it should be noted that the entire listing process is, not surprisingly, surrounded 
by secrecy. Thus, it is very difficult for an individual to obtain any meaningful 
information as to why his/her name has been included in the list. In the case of Sison,
42
 
one such people, requested access to the documents which had led the Council to include 
his name in the list by relying on Regulation 1049/2001 on pubic access to documents.
43
 
The Council refused even partial access to those documents relying on the fact that 
disclosure would undermine public security and international relations; and it also 
refused to disclose the identity of the States that had provided the information on the 
grounds that the originating authority opposed disclosure. Both the CFI and the ECJ have 
upheld the Council’s decision, thus excluding that Regulation 1049/2001 can ever apply 
to the information relating to inclusion in the list. The ruling might well be justified 
having regard to the public security exception since, were the principle of open access 
apply to such documents, it would most likely have to apply erga omnes, i.e. so that 
anyone could access such documents, something that might undoubtedly contrast with the 
public interest of both the Union and the Member State which instigated the listing. This 
said, in the above mentioned OMPI case,
44
 the Court of First Instance has held that the 
duty to state reasons and the right to a fair hearing apply, at least to a certain extent, to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and its Member States to claim the moral high-ground on such matters. See European Parliament 
Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention 
of prisoners (2006/2200); Report CIA Activities in Europe, 14 February 2007; Council of Europe, 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers 
involving Council of Europe Member States, available on statewatch.org.   
41
 Amnesty International Report (EU Office) Human Rights dissolving at the borders? Counter-terrorism 
and EU criminal law, 31/5/05, AI Index: IOR 61/013/2005, also available on 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior610132005, page 15. For the text of the decision see Council 
documents, Comments of the French delegation, presenting the main decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal on the European Arrest Warrant, 2/09/05, doc. No. 11902/05, COPEN 133, EJN 
52, EUROJUST 56.  
42
 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison v Council [2005] ECR II-1429, upheld in Case C-
266/05 P Sison v Council, judgment of 1 February 2007, nyr. 
43
 Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents [2001] OJ L 145/43. 
44
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr. 
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Council’s decision to include someone on the list. Following the decision, Council has 
indicated that it will provide those listed with such reasons;
45
 it remains to be seen 
however, whether Council will be willing to go much beyond a formal compliance with 
such duty. Given that the inclusion in the list is at the request of the Member States, there 
is a non-insignificant risk that the statement of reasons might, at best, simply identify the 
national authority’s decision (when indeed there is one) which has triggered the listing.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that in the context of the EU list, there is no procedure in place 
to request a Member State to review one’s case and make representations to the Council 
with a view to de-listing. This means that the only avenue open to a listed 
individual/organisation is a legal challenge to the legality of the inclusion of his/her name 
in the list. We will consider the problems arising in relation to such challenge in the next 
section. However, in the meanwhile, it should be noted how, in any event, ‘home-
terrorists’ are deprived of any access to judicial review at European level, since the 
European Courts do not have jurisdiction over Common Positions. The lack of a de-
listing procedure then leaves such applicants without even those minimal remedies 
afforded to those who are included in the UN list. We will deal with this issue further 
down below.  
 
IV THE EU FOREIGN TERRORISTS LIST AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: SOME 
STRUCTURAL DIFFICULTIES 
 
As said above, Common Position 2001/931/CFSP provides for two types of ‘terrorists’, 
those with a connection to third countries, and entirely EU based terrorists. It is only in 
relation to the former that freezing measures can be taken at Community level since the 
list of home terrorists is adopted using Title VI competence and therefore cannot benefit 
of the passarelle clause contained in Articles 60 and 301 EC.  
 
Regulation 2580/2001 implements Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and provides for 
the freezing of assets of those listed in the Common Position as regularly amended by the 
Council. According to Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931, the list must be 
updated by means of a Common Position at least every six months;
46
 such article applies 
also to the Regulation and in relation to that instrument the list is updated by means of a 
Council decision. The reason for the duplication is that the latter instrument is that 
applicable in relation to the Regulation, whilst the former, which contains both home and 
foreign terrorists, is the general CFSP one (which consequently cannot have direct 
effect). 
 
The Council Decision which lists the individuals subject to the freezing of assets 
provided for by the Regulation is naturally of direct and individual concern to those who 
                                                 
45
 See Notice for the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have been included by Council Decision 
2006/1008/EC of 21 December on the list of persons, groups and entities to which Regulation 2580/2001 
applies, (2006) C 320/02. 
46
 This time limit is currently being ignored by the Council; the last amendment was over 9 months ago, on 
29 May 2006, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP and Council Decision 2006/379/EC. 
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are identified in the Decision and therefore can be reviewed under Article 230 EC.
47
 
There is no doubt that cases concerning inclusion in the list could also be referred by 
national courts on a preliminary ruling.  In any case, however, since we are within the 
ambit of Community law, the Foto-Frost principle should apply and the only courts to 
have jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the applicant’s inclusion in the list are the 
Community courts.
48
 This might create significant problems, given that it is not obvious 
that the Rules of Procedure are suitable for accommodating such complex proceedings 
where sensitive evidence might have to be discussed.
49
 Furthermore, the duty to justify 
inclusion on the list would fall upon Council; however, the intelligence upon which 
inclusion in the list is based is national (if not altogether external to the EU) and not all of 
it might have been disclosed to Council for inclusion in the relevant file. This might lead 
to some difficulties since, presumably, and unless the relevant Member State is prepared 
to grant access to fuller intelligence, the case might fall to be decided, if at all, on the 
incomplete evidence contained in the file. The situation is even worse should the case 
reach the Court through means of a preliminary ruling since those proceedings are not 
adversarial in nature and, in relation to those proceedings, the right of the defence might 
well be compromised.
50
  
 
But even leaving aside the procedural difficulties in having the Community courts 
dealing with those cases, the real issue relates to the extent to which those courts are 
willing to conduct a substantive review of the Council decision to include someone on the 
list. A recent case might serve to illustrate the problem inherent in entrusting the 
Community courts with judicial review in such matters. In the above mentioned OMPI 
ruling,
51
 one of the organisations which had been listed in both the Common Position and 
in the Community list, and whose assets had consequently been frozen, brought an action 
for annulment in front of the CFI. The OMPI relied, inter alia, on infringement of a right 
to a fair hearing; infringement of the duty to state reasons; and on the infringement of the 
right to effective judicial protection. The Council had failed to hear the applicant either 
before or after its inclusion in the list; and it had refused to communicate the reasons 
which led to the decision to include it in the list, and the authority which had instigated 
such inclusion.  
 
                                                 
47
 Case T-229/02 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdistan National Congress (KKK),Order [2005] 
ECR I-539, para 27. In this case the CFI nonetheless found that the applicant, a Mr Ocalan who claimed to 
act on behalf of the PKK ,did not have standing since he could not claim to be the legal representative of an 
organisation which had ceased to exist. The flaws in the CFI’s argument have been fully exposed by AG 
Kokott in her Opinion on the appeal to the CFI ruling, Case C-229/05 P Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
and Kurdistan National Congress (KKK), Opinion of 27/09/2006; the Court has agreed with the AG and 
has quashed the CFI ruling, judgment of 18 January 2007, nyr.  
48
 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
49
 Cf also obiter at para 158 of Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v 
Council, judgment of 12 December 2006, nyr. 
50
 The situation would be incredibly difficult also given that Council would not be formally part of the 
proceedings even though it would of course be open to it to intervene. 
51
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr. 
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The Court found that the right to a fair hearing, the duty to state reason and the right to 
effective judicial protection all applied to the contested decision; however, it refused to 
engage in the substantive review of the reasons which led to the applicant’s inclusion in 
the list. Thus, it held that the right to be heard is limited to the opportunity for applicants 
to make know their views as to ‘the legal conditions of application of the Community 
measure in question’, i.e. as to whether there is specific information or material in the file 
which shows that a decision meeting the definition in Article 1(4) of Common Position 
2001/931 has been taken by a competent national authority, and in the case in which the 
case concerns the decision to maintain someone on the list, whether there is a justification 
for so doing. The Court also clarified that issues relating to the well-foundedness and 
appropriateness of the decision to include someone in the list can ‘only be raised at 
national level’. And as mentioned before, the Court indicated that Council bears no duty 
to investigate whether the national authority’s decision was adopted in proceedings 
conducted correctly or whether the fundamental rights of the parties concerned were 
respected by such authority. In its abdication of judicial responsibility, the Court went 
even further stating that even though one of the conditions for the legality of inclusion in 
the list is that the decision must have been based ‘on serious and credible evidence’, those 
affected by such decisions do not have a right to be heard in respect of such matters. 
Thus, in the Court’s view, ‘it would be inappropriate, in the light of the principle of 
sincere cooperation referred to in Article 10 EC, to make it subject to the exercise of a 
fair hearing at Community level’.52 The only exception to this principle arises when the 
Council based its decision to ‘freeze funds on information or evidence communicated to 
it by representatives of the Member States without it having being assessed by the 
competent national authority’. Whilst this qualification might at first sight look 
reassuring, since it might introduce a right to be heard in relation to the substance of the 
allegations, at closer scrutiny it constitutes a worrying indication that the Court might be 
willing to extend Council’s power beyond the, very limited, procedural requirements 
provided for in Article 1(4) Common Position 2001/931. That provision states that ‘The 
list in the Annex shall be drawn up on the basis of precise information or material in the 
relevant file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority 
(…)’. Article 1(4) is phrased in mandatory terms and does not seem to confer upon 
Council the power to include someone in the list regardless of a prior national authority’s 
decision. Yet, the Court seems to indicate that that would be possible.  
 
In the OMPI case, the CFI also recognised that, after the first order for the freezing of 
funds has taken place, those concerned have a right to be notified of the evidence 
adduced against them and a right to request a re-examination of the initial decision. 
However, the Court again qualified such right by stating that a hearing in such 
circumstances is not ‘automatically required’ since those concerned have in any event the 
right to bring judicial proceedings for annulment in front of the Community courts. The 
Council has also an obligation to state reasons which in these cases entail an obligation 
‘to state the matters of fact and law which constitute the legal basis of [the Council’s] 
                                                 
52
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr, para 122, emphasis added. 
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decision and the considerations which led it to adopt that decision’.53 In any event, 
however, those rights are subject to the public security/interest caveat so that Council is 
entitled to refuse disclosure of evidence and of information contained in the file to protect 
such interests. As to the extent to which ‘effective judicial protection’ is guaranteed by 
the Court, the ruling contains contradictory statements. Thus the Court first stated that the 
Community courts must be able to review both the lawfulness and the merits of the 
decision to freeze funds, without Council being entitled to refuse disclosure of the 
evidence, to then conclude that since it is not for the judiciary to substitute its assessment 
for that of the Council, the Court’s review must be restricted to ‘checking that the rules 
governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts 
are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the 
facts or misuse of powers’.54   
 
The OMPI case seems to indicate the Court’s unwillingness to engage with the 
substantive issues which determined inclusion in the list, preferring it to leave such issues 
to the competent national authority, thus ensuring that such decisions can be given pan-
European effect without the need for further scrutiny.
55
 Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that there is no guarantee that the decision would have been taken by a 
judicial authority (something which admittedly would make things less bleak from a 
fundamental rights perspective); that neither Common Position 2001/931 or the Court 
have defined what is to be intended for authority ‘equivalent’ to a judicial one; and that 
the Court indicates that such a decision does not in any event represent an essential 
procedural or substantive requirement for the legality of inclusion. This surrender of 
jurisdiction is legally questionable: once an individual or an organization has been placed 
on the EU list, then the matter becomes one governed by European Union law, and 
therefore subject to the conditions of legality imposed by such system including 
fundamental rights protection. The Court’s deference to national process is therefore 
puzzling: the standards upon which Union action must be assessed is that set by European 
Union law, not that set by national law. Moreover, the Court’s indication that not even 
Council should perform any substantive scrutiny seems to be inconsistent with Council’s 
duties as provided by Article 6 TEU.    
      
The other thorny issue relating to the list concerns whether the freezing of assets is 
properly defined as a criminal charge which should trigger the guarantees provided in 
Article 6 ECHR. The issue was argued in the Sison access to documents case,
56
 but the 
CFI decided that it was not relevant for that case, rather being an issue for consideration 
                                                 
53
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr, para 143. 
54
 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, judgment of 12 
December 2006, nyr, paras 155 and 159 respectively. 
55
 It could also be queried whether the OMPI ruling is consistent with the ruling in Ayadi, where, as we 
have seen above, the Court relied on the discretion conferred upon the Community legislature and upon 
national authorities to impose substantive duties upon the national authorities. It is puzzling then that the 
Community institutions should be subject to (arguably) lower standards than those imposed upon national 
authorities.   
56
 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison v Council [2005] ECR II-1429. 
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in the related case for annulment, which is still pending.
57
 In the OMPI the Court did not 
analyse the issue, even though given the low standard of review imposed on the 
Council’s decision, one might infer that the Court does not believe that such guarantees 
are necessary in relation to such cases  
 
Finally, it should be noted that Council seems not to be willing to respect the Court’s 
authority. In the OMPI case, the CFI annulled the inclusion of the applicant in the list; 
this notwithstanding the Council has failed to give effect to the ruling and the OMPI’s 
assets are still frozen. This is the case, even though, subsequently to the ruling, Council 
adopted a new Common Position and a new decision in order to add more individuals and 
organizations to its lists.
58
 Furthermore, Council has also indicated that it does not believe 
that the ruling affects the list annexed to the Common Position, since the CFI did not 
annul the inclusion of the applicant in that list.
59
 The reason why the CFI did not do so is 
of course because it did not have jurisdiction to review the Common Position. Given that 
Council is bound by fundamental rights regardless of whether it acts as a Community or a 
Union institution, and given that the CFI found that the applicant’s fundamental rights 
had been infringed, Council’s position is not only untenable but in blatant defiance of the 
rule of law.  
 
V. HOME MADE TERRORISTS AND EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION  
  
It is now time to consider the EU list of ‘home-terrorists’, i.e. those whose assets cannot 
be frozen.
60
 This area does not squarely fall within the scope of this contribution since it 
is only remotely connected to foreign policy. Yet, in order to give a more complete 
picture of the status of fundamental rights protection in the Union, it might be useful to 
make some remarks. This part of the list, like the foreign terrorist list, was adopted to 
give effect to the general anti-terrorism Resolution which, as mentioned before, requires 
States to take action (including the freezing of funds) against those identified as terrorists 
                                                 
57
 Case T-47/03 Sison v Council, case pending. 
58
 Council Decision 2006/1008 of implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001 on specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (2006) 
OJ L 379/123. It should also be noted that at the time of writing the Council has failed to update the 
existing list, even though more than 9 months have elapsed since the last update, thus also infringing 
Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931 which provides in mandatory terms the duty to review the list at 
least every six months. In the writer’s opinion such infringement constitutes infringement of an essential 
procedural (and substantive) requirement which should render the entire list void. On these issues see E. 
Spaventa ‘Fundamental Rights and the Interface between the Second and Third Pillar’ in A. Dashwood and 
M.Maresceau (eds), forthcoming 2007.     
59
 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the OMPI case T-228/02, 
para 3. The only concession the Council has made to the ruling is to undertake to provide  statement of 
reasons for those who assets have been frozen and to establish a clearer and more transparent procedure for 
reconsideration. See also Notice for the attention of those persons/groups/entities that have been included 
by Council Decision 2006/1008/EC of 21 December on the list of persons, groups and entities to which 
Regulation 2580/2001 applies, (2006) C 320/02.  
60
 The remarks in this section apply of course also to the ‘foreign’ terrorists insofar as they are listed in the 
Common Position. However, and as seen above, those have access to the court because of the freezing 
Regulation.  Following the remarks of the Council to the effect that annulment of the decision to include 
someone in the Regulation does not affect their inclusion in the list annexed to the Common Position, it 
cannot e excluded that even foreign terrorists might find themselves in this legal limbo. 
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or involved in supporting terrorism. Despite the clear UN mandate, the European Union 
institutions have limited themselves to a mere identification of those who should be 
considered as terrorist, without requiring the Member States to take any further action. 
Thus, the domestic part of the list has been adopted by mean of a Title VI Common 
Position, an instrument which simply sets policy objectives for the Union and it is not 
explicitly biding upon Member States (albeit the duty of loyal co-operation would apply). 
Furthermore, the Common Position demands no specific action from the Member States 
which are just required to ‘fully exploit their powers’ in relation to requests from other 
Member States authorities.  
 
The choice of a Common Position is therefore puzzling: on the one hand, it seems to put 
the Union in a questionable position from an international law viewpoint, since if those 
identified in the list are indeed terrorists, the Union and its Member States have an 
international law obligation to take action. And yet, the Common Position does not 
require Member States to freeze the assets of those therein identified therefore raising 
suspicions as to whether inclusion in the EU domestic list might not be politically 
motivated.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that the list has bee adopted in a Common Position might give 
raise to the suspicion that such choice might have been instrumental to the desire to evade 
any judicial (and democratic) accountability since, as said above, common positions are 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. This leads to the very concrete possibility that a 
person listed as ‘home-terrorist’ might find him/herself in a limbo where access to any 
judicial review is prevented. This issue has been raised in front of both the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Community courts by SEGI, an organization supporting 
Basque independence and included in the list of home terrorists. In front of the European 
Court of Human Rights, SEGI complained of breach of several Convention rights, 
including the presumption of innocence, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. The European Court of Human Rights refused to hear the case on the 
grounds that there had been only a potential rather than actual breach of the 
Convention.
61
 SEGI then brought an action for damages in front of the CFI, which 
dismissed the case since it has no jurisdiction to review Common Positions. As a result, 
and as acknowledged by the CFI itself, the claimant was left without any judicial 
remedy.
62
  
 
As far as de-listing is concerned, two solutions might be considered. First, one should 
consider the possibility for a national court to grant an injunction against the State 
requiring it to make representations in Council on behalf of the applicant, regardless of 
whether such possibility is provided for in the Common Position.  Furthermore, it could 
be argued that even where such possibility is not provided by national law, the national 
                                                 
61
 Decision declaring the inadmissibility of the case Segi and Gestoras pro-Amnistía v. 15 States of the 
European Union, appl. no 6422/02, and 9916/02, 23 May 2002. The ECtHR decision seems also to have 
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 Case T-338/02, Segi et al v. Council, order of 7/06/04, para 39; upheld in Case C-355/04 P Segi et al  
Council, judgment of 27 February 2007. See also the interesting opinion of AG Mengozzi, delivered on 26 
October 2006. 
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court might still, applying by analogy the principles elaborated in the context of the first 
pillar, and especially those elaborated in Ayadi, be under a Union law obligation to create 
a remedy to ensure that the principle of effective judicial protection is complied with. 
Secondly, in relation to national courts in those Member States which have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 35 TEU, the possibility should be considered 
that it would be open to the national court to assess whether the Common Position is not 
in fact a decision. According to Article 34 TEU a common position defines the 
‘approach’ of the Union to a particular matter. An instrument which identifies named 
individuals and requires Member States to engage in third pillar co-operation in relation 
to those individuals, is not merely defining the approach of the Union. Whilst it could be 
that the choice of instrument was dictated by the desire to save both words and legal 
instruments, it could be said that the list concerning home-terrorists is in fact a decision. 
Since the definition that the institutions give to an act is not conclusive, the national court 
could depart from it and make a preliminary reference to the ECJ to assess both whether 
the common position is in fact a decision and, should that be the case, whether inclusion 
of the applicant in the list is justified. This finding seems to find support in the European 
Court of Justice’s ruling in the appeal to the SEGI case.63 There, the Court held that the 
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 35 TEU, according to which framework decisions and 
decisions might be the subject of a preliminary ruling, is intended to ensure jurisdiction in 
relation to those acts which might produce legal effects in relation to third parties. A 
Common Position producing such effects might have a scope going beyond what 
provided for in Article 34 TEU, and the national court should feel empowered to make a 
preliminary reference to enquire if such is actually the case. Whilst the ECJ ruling is to be 
welcomed, it is also going to raise considerable issues of interpretation because of the 
reference to the need for the Common Position to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties.  It is not clear that a Common Position might in itself produce such effects: whilst 
the prejudice to those therein listed is clear, there is no ‘legal’ consequence, strictly 
speaking, following from inclusion in such list. It would have therefore been better if the 
Court had simply focused on the nature of the act, regardless of the ‘legal’ effects to third 
parties.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this contribution I have tried to voice some concerns over the increasing use of Union 
competence in fields which affect individual rights. This is particularly worrying in those 
cases where judicial scrutiny is more limited. In this respect, I would argue that the 
failure in the Union institutional structure to provide for effective judicial (and 
democratic) accountability might push the standard of fundamental rights protection 
below the minimum guarantees provided by the ECHR. Truth be told, the same could be 
said with many of the developments that have occurred as a result of the ‘war on terror’. 
Whilst the UN smart sanctions might have been a reasonable response to the need to 
isolate ‘nasty’ regimes, the practice of identifying individuals as ‘terrorists’ without 
having put into place any system aimed at counterchecking a decision which is, at the end 
of the day, exclusively executive based is extremely worrying. The CFI ruling in Yusuf, 
even when tamed by the ruling in Ayadi, constitutes an uncritical, and therefore 
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 Case C-355/04 P SEGI at al. v Council, judgment of 27 February 2007, nyr. 
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dangerous, reception of the status quo. The same can be sad about the ruling in the OMPI 
case. The latter, despite appearances, falls short of even those minimum guarantees 
established in Ayadi.  
 
The abdication of judicial responsibility in this field is particularly worrying, not least 
since the very definition of what, and who, constitutes a terrorist is politically motivated. 
And it is in the realm of politics, not of law, that any a priori definition should apply. The 
debate as to whether we should entertain relations with a Hamas-led government in 
Palestine, with the PKK, or even with the IRA or ETA, is a political debate. But the 
realm of the law is different: by definition, we are not concerned with a priori 
assessments. We are concerned only with whether a crime, even a broadly defined one, 
has been committed. If so, prosecution should ensue regardless of any political 
assessment and with all the guarantees afforded to the defendant. But, other than that, we 
should resist any temptation to justify the sacrifice of our fundamental rights on the altar 
of that undefined god who is fighting the ‘war on terror’ on our behalf. This said, it seems 
that the Member States are taking a rather different view on the matter; the guarantees 
which we once knew as standard are not so any longer. There is no democratic nor clear 
judicial accountability for those decisions. Rather, international and inter-governmental 
action is being used as a shelter. It is for this reason that judicial activism is needed. But 
we should be conscious of the fact that judicial activism is only a palliative treatment for 
such an acute endemic disease in the European Union. The only appropriate treatment 
lies with a Treaty amendment, as it would have been provided by the Constitutional 
Treaty. Lacking such a step, the Member States should refrain (and can indeed refrain) 
from acting at Union level in matters that affect individual rights.    
 
  
